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Purpose: This paper presents a first exploration of governmental duty of care towards 
scientists involved in science diplomacy by focusing on disaster research. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: The method is a conceptual exploration, using specific case 
studies and potential scenarios within theories and practices of science diplomacy and duty of 
care, to raise questions and to suggest policy recommendations for government. The focus on 
disaster research links the analysis to disaster diplomacy, namely how and why disaster-
related activities (in this case, science) do and do not influence peace and conflict. 
 
Findings: From examining case studies of, and outputs and outcomes from, disaster-related 
science diplomacy, governments need to consider duty of care issues in advance and develop 
a science diplomacy strategy, rather than responding after the fact or developing policy ad 
hoc. 
 
Practical implications: Policy recommendations are provided to try to ensure that 
governments avoid simply reacting after a crisis, instead being ready for a situation before it 
arises and drawing on others’ experience to improve their own actions. 
 
Social implications: Improved interaction between science and society is discussed in the 
context of diplomacy, especially for disaster-related activities. 
 
Originality/value: Governmental duty of care has not before been applied to science 
diplomacy. The focus on disaster-related science further provides a comparatively new 










Connecting science diplomacy, duty of care, and disaster-related research 
 
This paper presents a first exploration of governmental duty of care towards scientists 
conducting science diplomacy by focusing on disaster research. The exploration is 
conceptual, with this section providing basic concepts and illustrating them with scenarios. 
Then, examples of disaster-related science diplomacy are provided, leading to discussion of 
outputs and outcomes alongside the possible duty of care situations which could arise for 
governments. The questions raised lead to policy implications. 
 
Diplomacy here is defined as peaceful interactions amongst representatives from different 
political jurisdictions. These interactions could be formal, such as in the United Nations (UN) 
or official bilateral meetings, or informal, away from recorded minutes and rule-based 
proceedings. Diplomacy with this definition occurs beyond sovereign states and is not 
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necessarily confined to representatives of their jurisdictions, instead merely being from 
different political jurisdictions. Non-sovereign territories, supranational entities such as the 
European Union (EU), and subnational jurisdictions such as provinces and municipalities are 
involved in diplomatic endeavours, with examples being trade and environmental agreements, 
arts and culture exchanges, and post-disaster assistance. Diplomatic processes outside of 
sovereign state representatives are termed para-diplomacy, proto-diplomacy, and micro-
diplomacy (Baldacchino and Milne, 2009; Duchacek et al., 1998; Tavares, 2009). 
 
Whilst representatives involved in diplomacy have traditionally been from governments, 
diplomacy is also enacted by many different parties including celebrities, media, arts 
organisations, religious groups, sports teams, and ordinary people (Diamond and McDonald, 
1993; Kurbalija and Katrandjiev, 2006; Sending et al., 2011). Science and scientists can also 
be involved in diplomacy. Science refers to formalised investigations for the purpose of 
generating new and original knowledge, thus covering all disciplines including physics, 
anthropology, law, ecology, geography, engineering, education, medicine, international 
relations, chemistry, and political science. Science diplomacy is thus peaceful interactions 
across political jurisdictions for purposes related to knowledge production, typically (but not 
exclusively) considering political jurisdictions with some form of conflict which might or 
might not be violent. It could be enacted by scientists or for scientific endeavours such as 
research projects, publications, and conferences. The process of science diplomacy has long 
been pursued across numerous fields, but scholarship covering the term and concept has only 
more recently and more formally been developing as a field of study, including with detailed 
empirical examples (e.g. Davis and Patman, 2015; Tonami, 2016). 
 
Within science diplomacy’s remit, scientists sometimes accept formal diplomatic posts or 
pursue formal diplomacy. Edward Jenner from England became so respected for introducing 
the smallpox vaccine in 1796 that he later mediated prisoner exchanges between France and 
England. From 1954-1969, Henry Kissinger was an academic staff member at Harvard 
University, becoming Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and, from 1973-
1977, US Secretary of State, the country’s top diplomat. Condoleezza Rice was a Professor at 
Stanford from 1981-1993 before becoming the university’s Provost from 1993-1999 and then 
US Secretary of State from 2005-2009. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga was a Professor at the 
University of Montréal from 1965-1998 before becoming President of Latvia from 1999-
2007. 
 
Nevertheless, science diplomacy usually occurs via actively researching scientists who might 
or might not be interested in the diplomatic outcomes of their science. The Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and World Affairs (http://www.pugwash.org) are a deliberate attempt 
to use science for the diplomatic end of eliminating weapons of mass destruction including 
nuclear weapons. 
 
Eliminating weapons of mass destruction is an example of disaster risk reduction. Disaster-
related research has shown that the root causes of disasters, and the process of disaster risk 
reduction, are inevitably political (Cuny, 1983; Hewitt, 1983, 1997; Lewis, 1999; Wisner et 
al., 2004). One dimension of the disasters-politics nexus is disaster diplomacy, examining 
how and why disaster-related activities—before, during, and after disasters—do and do not 
influence peace and conflict (Kelman, 2012, 2016). Disaster diplomacy has variously been 
defined as a concept, a process, a field of study, or a diplomatic subset, with Yim et al. (2009) 
providing apt critiques of its presentation. 
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Here, disaster diplomacy focuses on processes of and investigations about disaster-related 
activities influencing diplomacy, thereby encompassing processes of both science and 
diplomacy while covering research, policy, and practice. The process is specifically 
unidirectional, from disaster-related activities to diplomacy, rather than the other way around 
which is effectively the truism of politics influencing disaster-related activities (Cuny, 1983; 
Hewitt, 1983, 1997; Lewis, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004). Disaster diplomacy research and 
application cover the combination of the diplomacy required for reducing disaster risk and the 
diplomacy involved in effecting peace and conflict, Hence, disaster diplomacy is a suitable 
focus for studying science diplomacy since scientists and science are frequently involved in 
all such activities. Few publications have thus far touched upon the science diplomacy 
implications, or lack thereof, emerging from disaster diplomacy. 
 
One science diplomacy discussion for disaster research has been Cuban and American 
scientists collaborating on hurricane monitoring, El Niño impacts, and climate variability and 
trends during Fidel Castro’s leadership of Cuba (Glantz, 2000). The cooperation was 
successful at a scientific level, but had no discernible impact on political or diplomatic 
processes, with Cuba-US relations eventually thawing due to a change in political leadership 
in Cuba. The scientific collaboration might even have succeeded because politicians were not 
aware of it and so could not interfere with it—or politicians might have pretended not to be 
aware of it. That is, the scientific interaction remained at the scientific level without science 
diplomacy resulting. The same is true for more recent calls for Cuba-US scientific 
collaboration on disease and medicine (Fink et al., 2014), earthquakes (Yeats, 2014), and 
wider environmental research (Boom, 2012) which seek joint science rather than science 
diplomacy. 
 
Had the political leaders been aware of the scientific interaction, or openly acknowledged it 
happening, prospects exist for the scientists ending up in legal trouble. Americans wishing to 
visit Cuba under Fidel Castro’s reign faced severe travel restrictions. Many, including 
scientists, circumvented the rules by travelling to Cuba via a location outside the US and, 
upon entering Cuba, requesting that their passport not be stamped. The US government could 
have prosecuted Americans doing so, but did not. 
 
Meanwhile, Fidel Castro ran Cuba as a totalitarian dictatorship which was long criticised for 
human rights abuses, as documented independently from the US government’s attempts to 
discredit Fidel Castro (Platt, 1988). Had the Cuban government decided, any Cuban scientist 
working with Americans could have been removed from their job, imprisoned, and potentially 
tortured. An American scientist visiting Cuba could have suffered a similar fate—as shown 
by Alan Gross, a USAID contractor arrested in Cuba for spying despite entering the country 
openly to install internet equipment (Leogrande, 2015). 
 
In such instances, what actions should governments take? The US government could take the 
stance that they owe no support to any American or Cuban scientists arrested in Cuba as a 
result of US-Cuba scientific cooperation. This issue relates to the duty of care of a 
government to scientists involved in science diplomacy, with the focus here being disaster 
research and hence disaster diplomacy. 
 
The duty of care to prevent disasters has long been studied in law (Morison, 1948) and in its 
moral sense apart from legal requirements (Kenyon, 1996). For disasters, a clear duty of care 
has been placed on sovereign governments to protect its citizens or to accept external 
assistance for doing so (Davies, 2010), with such discussions covering both legal and moral 
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aspects. Yet for epidemic disasters, “duty of care” has been lambasted as “at best, too vague 
and, at worst, ethically dangerous…Duty of care is neither fixed nor absolute but heavily 
dependent on context” (Sokol, 2006, p. 1238). This statement is further shown by the duty of 
care literature which rarely provides a consistent definition for the term and which focuses on 
discussions of operational actions, with disaster-linked scenarios including humanitarian 
interventions (Arbour, 2008) and emergency medicine (Schultz, 2012). 
 
The question of duty of care of a government to its scientists working outside their country is 
not prominent in the literature regarding morals or legalities, actual or speculated. There is 
also ambiguity regarding whether the priority is the legal or moral component of duty of 
care—or both in combination, irrespective of proportions selected. Here, to embrace the full 
range of possibilities from the literature, duty of care is used in its moral sense which does not 
preclude, but moves beyond, purely legal dimensions. The next section explores case studies 
and scenarios related to science diplomacy for disaster research. 
 
Case studies and scenarios 
 
This section describes examples of science diplomacy for disaster research, including outputs 
and outcomes, while exploring possible scenarios involving duty of care of the scientists’ 
governments to them. 
 
Examples of science diplomacy for disaster research 
 
In March 2012, the American Association for the Advancement of Science began a quarterly 
publication entitled Science & Diplomacy (http://www.sciencediplomacy.org). In the nineteen 
issues published up to September 2016 with a total of 115 articles, the word “disaster” is 
mentioned in sixteen articles (in one article, just in the references) but no articles discuss 
“duty of care”. The articles mentioning “disaster” balance: 
 natural and non-natural hazards; 
 before, during, and after disasters; 
 disasters as a separate scientific topic and disasters integrated with other science such as 
development and health; and 
 the hazard and vulnerability components of disaster risk. 
When searching for specific hazard-related terms, such as “climate” and “earthquake”, many 
other articles are listed. Searches for “vulnerability” and “vulnerable” yield no new disaster-
related articles, but other articles appear using the words in different contexts. Consequently, 
a wide range of science diplomacy for disaster research exists, although no disaster diplomacy 
outcomes are indicated. This gamut of examples is reflected across other literature, although 
the work is infrequently identified directly as science diplomacy. 
 
Since the 1990s, the World Meteorological Organization has promoted Climate Outlook 
Forums in most regions of the world in which scientists and users collaborate to generate a 
consensus on climate projections for the coming season (http://public.wmo.int/en/our-
mandate/climate/regional-climate-outlook-products). Some of the climate outlook forums 
involve countries in conflict, such as the North Eurasia Climate Outlook Forum including 
Armenia and Azerbaijan; the Caribbean Climate Outlook Forum including American and 
Cuban scientists; the Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum including Eritrea and 
Ethiopia; and the South Asian Climate Outlook Forum including Afghanistan, India, and 
Pakistan. Activities include developing probabilistic climate outlooks, discussing potential 
implications for different sectors, training for using the outlooks, and applying 
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communication strategies. An evaluation of climate outlook forums in Africa indicated the 
importance of connecting all the activities to avoid probabilistic forecasts being taken as set 
predictions, to maintain trust, and to translate the climate outlooks into on-the-ground support 
for livelihoods decisions (Patt, 2007). Diplomatic aims and outcomes including disaster 
diplomacy are not present, suggesting that the climate outlook forums are for science only. 
 
Similarly, despite Iran’s isolation from many other countries, including the UK and the US, 
extensive scientific activities occur jointly. The British Council sponsored events in Iran in 
2007 and 2016, with the latter connecting to disasters by studying epidemics and global health 
including the Zika virus. Between 2005 and 2017, Iran has held eight Integrated Disaster 
Management (INDM) Conferences, typically inviting UK scientists as keynote speakers. 
 
Despite this science diplomacy, disaster diplomacy has not manifested and Iran has a difficult 
record with some other scientists. Canadian-Iranian social anthropologist Homa Hoodfar from 
Concordia University was arrested in Iran in June 2016 after being denied permission to leave 
the country. She was released in September 2016. Iranian Omid Kokabee was studying for his 
PhD in laser physics at the University of Texas when he was arrested in Iran in January 2011 
while visiting his family, allegedly for giving secrets to the US government. He stated that it 
was because he refused to work on Iran’s nuclear programme. He was released in August 
2016. Several Iranian nuclear scientists have been murdered in Iran, with outside scientists 
condemning the killings and stating instead that science should and could be used for peace 
(Hecker and Milani, 2015). 
 
In such contexts, duty of care dilemmas emerge. If a scientist from an ostensibly neutral 
country such as Austria or Norway travels to Iran to support the country’s nuclear 
programme, what duty of care would the government owe to their citizen in case of arrest in 
Iran? Would it matter if the scientist states that they were supporting the nuclear power 
programme, the nuclear weapons programme, both, or neither? If the scientist travels for an 
international conference on nuclear science, rather than working in a lab alongside Iranian 
counterparts, would it make a difference? For answering such questions, it is clear that, on 
paper, the country of nationality owes as much consular assistance as feasible to their citizens, 
but this principle provides extensive leeway for the parties involved to decide according to 
circumstances. Iran does not recognise dual citizenship, so Hoodfar was denied access to 
Canadian diplomats. Canada’s government nonetheless pressured Iran over her detention, 
although how much real support was provided, publically or secretly, is disputed. 
 
If Israel were the country in which the scientist from Norway or Austria is arrested, would 
duty of care change? Palestinian astrophysicist Imad al-Barghouti was arrested by Israel in 
2014 and 2016 for allegedly anti-Israel comments. A Norwegian or Austrian scientist could 
easily make similar, or worse, public comments and then visit Israel for tourism, a conference, 
or collaboration with colleagues. Alternatively, the scientist might visit to assist Israel with its 
nuclear programme and/or to support Palestinian independence. If the scientist were arrested, 
the circumstances would influence public reaction and could impact the Norwegian or 
Austrian government’s duty of care to the scientist. 
 
Historical examples exist, such as the Cuba-US scientific collaboration under Fidel Castro’s 
rule, mentioned earlier (Glantz, 2000). During the Cold War and during the USSR-to-Russia 
transition, one American climate scientist travelled to Moscow to research and publish with 
Soviet/Russian scientists on environmental disasters in the USSR (Glantz and Orlovsky, 
1983; Glantz et al., 1993) despite continual censorship on these topics (Ziegler, 1990). Had 
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the American scientist been arrested in the USSR or Russia, the US government would owe a 
duty of care, since the visits were legitimate and legal. Had an American scientist been 
arrested in Cuba, the duty of care of the US government to the scientist is less obvious, since 
the scientist would have been travelling to Cuba against US government advice and against 
American law. 
 
This raises the question of a government’s duty of care towards a scientist travelling to a 
location against their government’s advice. In October 2016, the UK government advised 
against all travel in Eritrea within 25 km of the Ethiopian border and most travel in Ethiopia 
within 10 km of the Eritrean border. Nabro volcano sits in Eritrea adjacent to the Ethiopian 
border. Until it erupted in 2011 with seven fatalities and 12,000 evacuees, it had no known 
Holocene eruptions, so was classified as inactive (Clarisse et al., 2014; Goitom et al., 2015). 
For disaster response, collecting data on the volcano is paramount in order to analyse its 
potential behaviour. UK seismologists and volcanologists had been working in the area, 
including for cross-border work, building up a substantive baseline of knowledge and 
scientific contacts, permitting them to respond rapidly in 2011; in fact, one UK scientist was 
in Asmara at the time of the eruption (Goitom et al., 2015; Hammond, 2016). If Nabro 
erupted again while the area was under a UK travel warning, the UK scientists would consider 
travelling there to continue their work and would likely be invited there in order to do so. If 
they run into medical or political trouble, the UK government would need to consider 
carefully the government’s duty of care to the scientists. 
 
The Eritrea-Ethiopia border situation complements similar work by UK volcanologists and 
seismologists for Mount Paektu (Changbaishan / Baekdusan) which straddles the China-North 
Korea border. Paektu’s eruption just over 1,000 years ago was one of the largest volcanic 
explosions in human history, so with the potential for further activity, North Korean scientists 
reached out to their UK counterparts for collaboration (Hammond, 2016; Stone, 2011, 2013). 
Persevering to overcome the challenges of securing government permission for cooperation, 
travel, and bringing equipment into North Korea through the international sanctions, the 
scientists continue to work together on analysing data from the monitoring network they set 
up and from the volcanic samples they acquired. In this instance, with full governmental 
cooperation on both sides and the travel being fully legal, the UK government should abide 
by their duty of care to the UK scientists if the scientists were injured or jailed in North 
Korea. 
 
The experiences of UK volcanologists in Eritrea and North Korea led to five lessons for 
ensuring science diplomacy success: “1. Strong, clear science objectives; 2. Enthusiastic 
scientific partners; 3. Good, open communication; 4. Delivering on promises made (and 
therefore ensuring that commitments are realistic in the first place); and 5. Flexibility” 
(Hammond, 2016, p. 7). Security, safety, morality, and legality are not listed, perhaps under 
the assumption that those aspects are obvious or perhaps because the focus is directly and 
almost exclusively on the science, rather than seeking diplomatic or objectives 
simultaneously. In their articles on Eritrea and North Korea, the scientists label their work as 
being science diplomacy, yet the goals, actions, and outcomes are all described as being 
scientific, with little substance regarding diplomacy and no disaster diplomacy consequences 
mentioned. 
 
One success factor might be the focus on physical science through examining environmental 
hazards, which is often presumed to be objective, neutral, and apolitical, even though it is not 
(Martin, 1979). The appearance of objectivity, neutrality, and lack of politics might permit the 
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work to take place. By comparison, the root cause of disasters, the vulnerability part of the 
disaster risk equation, is political by definition, with policies and practices which create and 
perpetuate, or tackle and reduce, vulnerability often emerging due to political ideology 
(Hewitt, 1983; Wisner et al., 2004). The political nature of vulnerability research might stop 
science diplomacy and disaster diplomacy. Even though some of the joint studies for Cuba, 
Eritrea, and North Korea report vulnerability aspects, the research has neither collected data 
on the vulnerabilities present nor analysed the reasons for the vulnerabilities existing. 
 
Meanwhile, detailed disaster vulnerability studies for Cuba (Aguirre, 2005; Sims and 
Vogelmann, 2002) and Mount Paektu (Choi et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2016) are not 
representative of science diplomacy, since the former are by only US-based scientists and the 
latter are by only South Korea based scientists. This situation does not denigrate the scientific 
work. It simply means that a potential gap remains in disaster-related science diplomacy of 
conducting joint, detailed analyses for identifying and redressing disaster vulnerabilities. 
 
Outputs and outcomes from scientists collaborating on disaster research 
 
The case studies of science diplomacy for disaster research led to definite outputs, with less 
clear outcomes. The outputs fall into the two typical categories of scientific outputs: 
publications and projects. 
 
Publications are both peer-reviewed (such as journal papers and books, e.g. Glantz et al. 
(1993) and Goitum et al., (2015)) and non-peer-reviewed (such as news or newsletter articles, 
e.g. Glantz and Orlovsky (1983) and Stone (2011, 2013)). Joint authorship by scientists from 
the countries involved is typical, such as North Korean and British scientists publishing on the 
volcanology of Mount Paektu with one China-based author (Kyong-Song et al., 2016). 
Another manner of publishing together for science diplomacy is editing, such as an American 
scientist editing books with chapters from a Cuban scientist covering Cuba dealing with El 
Niño and La Niña (Naranjo-Diaz, 2000, 2002). 
 
Grant-based projects comprise the other main output category. Field work requires money for 
travel and equipment. Researchers sometimes need to be paid, such as doctoral student 
stipends, post-doctoral fellowships, or researcher time for institutes without full core 
financing. The work cited in the previous paragraph emerges from funded projects, with 
granting agencies including the United Nations Foundation and the Richard Lounsbery 
Foundation. 
 
Outcomes are harder to delineate than outputs. Friendships, exchanges, and mutual learning 
and teaching resulted from the work cited here, facilitating the continuing science. Outcomes 
related to the effectiveness of the disaster-related activities and the consequences for 
diplomacy, namely disaster diplomacy, are almost absent. No spillover into US-Cuba 
cooperation was identified based on the science diplomacy. Instead, the two countries’ 
rapprochement occurred because Cuba’s leadership changed from Fidel Castro (Hershberg 
and LeoGrande, 2016). None of the collaborating Cuban or American scientists were involved 
in this political shift or appear to have influenced it. 
 
Given that so many cross-border scientific collaborations happen due to an individual 
scientist choosing to work with another individual scientist, it might be that disaster 
diplomacy outcomes should be neither sought nor expected. Sometimes, scientists or their 
funders actively seek diplomatic outcomes, or state that they do. Sometimes the collaboration 
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is for just the publication and project outputs. For instance, it might seem apposite to interpret 
the Norwegian Programme for Research Cooperation with China as part of mending relations 
with China following Chinese activist Liu Xiaobo being awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, 
but the programme began in 2009 (Research Council of Norway, 2009) following a 2007 
government white paper (Government of Norway, 2007). 
 
Even when research is directly funded by a government, science diplomacy is not necessarily 
sought. A Canadian engineer and an Iranian engineer might wish to collaborate on earthquake 
engineering, so they do, irrespective of their governments’ relations. They might even be at 
the same institution, perhaps in a third country such as New Zealand, so collaboration 
happens, as in September 2016 when New Zealand’s Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment awarded two Auckland universities an earthquake engineering grant for staff 
members of Canadian and Iranian origins (University of Auckland, 2016). No intimation is 
given that disaster diplomacy was sought, nor do any researcher connections with their 
countries of origin or compatriots seem to be pertinent. Instead, it is a grant for research and 
application, judged on those merits alone. 
 
The New Zealand government’s duty of care to the scientists then becomes pertinent. 
Irrespective of the researchers’ citizenship(s), they might consider travelling to Iran to present 
their work, such as at the Integrated Disaster Management Conference, and to collaborate 
with Tehran’s International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology. If these 
scientists are treated like Hoodfar or Kokabee, then the New Zealand government would need 
to examine their duty of care to their scientists in the context of the scientists’ passport 
countries, of Iran’s view of the scientists’ citizenships, and of the source of the grant money 
for travelling to Tehran. Considering that the grant was awarded for earthquake engineering 
technology which averts building collapse in an earthquake and which permits a quicker 
return to business afterwards, the New Zealand government might have a duty of care towards 
New Zealanders to ensure that the scientists can return to New Zealand and support retrofits 
of buildings. 
 
If outputs and outcomes from disaster research are focused on science diplomacy or not, does 
the duty of care change? Even where influencing diplomacy is not intended, it can occur. 
Arctic research, including environmental monitoring, is suggested as reducing the chance of 
military conflict in the region (Goodsite et al., 2016). Conversely, American medical science 
diplomacy in Indonesia fomented conflict there through accusations of the Americans spying 
(Smith III, 2014). In the life sciences, one approach for both scientific education and research 
discusses diplomacy as being tacit, with collaborations naturally forming over scientific work 
and leading to wider acceptance and cooperation amongst countries which might not 
otherwise be prone to it. 
 
An outcome from science can thus potentially be improved or worsened diplomacy, whether 
or not diplomatic influences are sought. None of the suggested science diplomacy successes 
are for disaster-related research, indicating that outcomes from disaster diplomacy via 
research might be less likely to succeed than other science diplomacy. It could also be that, 
thus far, less effort has been put into deliberately relating science diplomacy back to disaster 
diplomacy, either for research or for action. Such possible policy implications will be 
explored further in this paper’s final section. 
 
Policy implications and conclusions 
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Much science diplomacy for disaster research occurs inadvertently or at low diplomatic 
levels, with the research sometimes directly supported by governments and sometimes not. 
Tacit or passive science diplomacy is depicted most often in the case studies, with the 
research aiming for scientific rather than diplomatic outputs and outcomes; that is, disaster 
diplomacy is not sought from the science. 
 
One policy could be for governments to push active science diplomacy by placing diplomatic 
expectations on scientists—or for scientists to choose to adopt active diplomatic roles. 
Kissinger, as a government-employed diplomat, was accorded a duty of care from the US 
government, as provided to any senior diplomat. Pugwash scientists might be employed by a 
government agency as scientists, but not as diplomats, so determining governmental duty of 
care is more intricate. Governments have multiple ways of using scientists for disaster 
diplomacy, officially and unofficially, but there are complex intricacies in science diplomacy 
beyond strict scientific endeavours. 
 
For instance, Israeli and Iranian scientists were on the programme for the International 
Sociological Associations’ World Congress of Sociology in Japan in 2014. They could be 
asked, formally or informally, by their governments to meet informally to discuss diplomacy 
or they might decide to do so themselves. They might each travel to another location such as 
Oslo to work with local collaborators and then meet, deliberately or inadvertently, with or 
without their governments’ acquiescence. In all such instances, differences can arise in the 
intention and the expressed intention of the different parties involved. How well would the 
desire to establish or enhance relationships amongst learned societies match the desire to 
establish or enhance diplomatic relationships? 
 
When trying to determine or match intentions, various opportunities arise and can be created. 
Using scientists as spies has a long history (Price, 2000; Schultz, 2012), so possibilities exist 
for scientists as secret diplomats. In such cases, a government should plan in advance its 
moral and legal duty of care to the scientists if the scientists encounter trouble, including 
considering any difference if the scientists’ activities were within or outside of the scientists’ 
research expertise or remit from their government. Examples are advising dissidents, climbing 
a mountain or building to take photos, and placing monitoring equipment. 
 
Scientists are willing to be activists for disaster topics. Jim Hansen, one of the contemporary 
leaders of climate change research who was employed at the US government agency NASA 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration) until his retirement in 2013, was arrested 
outside the White House in 2011 for protesting against a fossil fuel pipeline which, Hansen 
believes, contributes to environmental destruction (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2013). 
The arrest occurred in Hansen’s own country, but the pipeline originates in Alberta’s Tar 
Sands. If Hansen were arrested in Ottawa, what would be the US government’s duty of care 
towards him? If a US government-employed scientist were arrested for protesting against 
climate change in countries less friendly than Canada towards the US, such as India or Iran, 
what would be the US government’s duty of care towards the scientist? Activism or disaster 
diplomacy could be supported (or opposed) by the US government or accepted (or opposed) 
as part of the role of being a US government scientist. 
 
In the above scenarios, from being a secret diplomat to a public activist, if the scientist’s 
government encourages or organises the non-scientific activities, then a further duty of care 
decision is how much the government should admit knowing. As described above, Cuba-US 
scientific collaboration for disaster-related research was successful because the US 
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government was (or pretended to be) ignorant about it. A government could similarly pretend 
to be entirely unaware of any scientist who is given disaster diplomacy or activist tasks. 
 
Moreover, governments are not homogeneous entities. One department or civil servant could 
support a specific science diplomacy activity for disaster research, or science-based disaster 
diplomacy, while another department or civil servant opposes it. Politicians come from 
different parties and ideologies, leading to varying views of permissible engagement with 
other countries. 
 
Scientists need to recognise that inaction or non-interference from their own government is 
not the same as their own government being ignorant of or uncaring about the scientist’s 
activities. Governments need to consider duty of care issues in advance and to develop a 
science diplomacy strategy, rather than responding after the fact or developing policy ad hoc. 
Extended exploration of science diplomacy frameworks and categories would be needed 
contributions, especially continuing empirical testing of science diplomacy frameworks (see 
also Vanc and Fitzpatrick, 2016). 
 
As one example of work on frameworks, USC Center on Public Diplomacy (2010, pp. 11-16) 
reports on a keynote given by Vaughan Turekian on “Science Diplomacy and the Prevention 
of Conflict”. It is reported that he delineates three science diplomacy categories. First, 
“science in diplomacy” is about researching diplomacy, global issues, and foreign policies. 
Second, “diplomacy for science” refers to scientists requesting diplomatic assistance to carry 
out science. Third, “science for diplomacy” is suggested as being the core meaning of science 
diplomacy, namely “international science cooperation” (p. 12). These descriptions are rather 
general and do not include a potential fourth category of diplomacy in science, in which the 
scientific process or scientists are used for enacting diplomacy, as described above. These 
four categories clearly overlap and lead to specific actions, some described by Turekian in 
USC Center on Public Diplomacy (2010), such as personnel and data exchanges. 
Consequently, these points provide a useful baseline to begin discussions on a framework for 
analysing science diplomacy which should be a priority for a research agenda. 
 
Another major element of a research agenda would be seeking examples (i) where science 
diplomacy for disaster-related activities has resulted in new diplomatic gains or new conflict 
and (ii) where duty of care—morally, legally, or both—was deliberately enacted to support 
scientists involved in disaster diplomacy, deliberately or inadvertently. As shown by this 
paper, the evidence thus far tends to affirm the current disaster diplomacy conclusions that 
disaster-related activities, including science, sometimes catalyse existing diplomatic and 
conflict processes, but do not create new such endeavours. The evidence also suggests that 
science diplomacy is rarely considered regarding duty of care to scientists involved in disaster 
diplomacy. An unambiguous counterexample would overturn some of these conclusions, 
reinforcing the need for further empirical research (see also Vanc and Fitzpatrick, 2016). 
 
Calls for education and training on science diplomacy for professionals and generalists are 
also poignant (Turekian and Wang, 2014). These calls suggest the importance of a research 
agenda on (i) curriculum content and form; (ii) expected impacts of education and training, 
followed by monitoring of the actual impacts; and (iii) the potential duty of care of the 




Science, diplomacy, disaster-related activities, and duty of care each involves multiple parties 
engaging in various actions, leading to complexities regarding their interactions and 
theorisations of fractal characteristics including for crises (Bjola, 2015). As with disaster-
related activities including disaster diplomacy, the key for duty of care for disaster-related 
science diplomacy is planning and preparing in advance. Much more work is needed to make 
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